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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
S & F SUPPLY COMPANY, a Utah corporation; BURGERJN-THE-ROUND, a Delaware
corporation, ANDREW W. SOUVALL,
TOULA P. SOUVALL, his wife; PETER W.
SOUVALL, MARY SOUVALL, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a National Association,
Intervening Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No.
12686

vs.
S. CRAIG HUNTER,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appellant's Reply Brief
The statement of the nature of the case, the disposition
in the lower court, and the relief sought on appeal have heretofore been set forth in appellant's brief, and are not, therefore, set forth herein. However, appellant does desire to clarify some of the facts set forth in the brief of intervening plaintiff-respondent. In addition thereto, appellant desires to respond to certain of the legal arguments raised in the brief of
intervening plaintiff-respondent.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In its brief, intervening plaintiff-respondent has challenged appellant's version of the record as set forth in appellant's Statement of Facts. As part of the challenge, Zions
1
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First National Bank has prepared its own Statement of Facts
and introduced much new material in its brief. Considerable
time has elapsed and plaintiffs-respondents have failed to file
a brief, apparently relying upon the brief filed by the Bank.
In the interim, appellant has retained the law firm of Strong
& Hanni, as associate counsel, for the purposes of filing this
reply brief and presenting oral argument to this Honorable
Court. It is not appellant's intention to restate the various
facts and arguments which were set forth in his original brief.
However, appellant recognizes the complexity of the facts
involved in this case and deems it imperative to reply to intervening plaintiffs-respondents within the limitations of Rule
75 (p) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
To accomplish this purpose, appellant will stand upon
the statement of the facts in his original brief. It is appellant's
contention that the same represents a fair reading of the record
and that they are adequately and fully documented. There are
numerous statements in the Bank's brief which appellant contends are incorrect and not supported in the record. They will
be discussed under the various appropriate points of argument.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE BANK WAS THE AGENT OF
THE PLAINTIFFS FOR THE GIVING OF INFORMATION ABOUT UNIVERSAL LEASING TO THE DEFENDANT, AND FURTHER THAT A PRINCIPAL IS
LIABLE FOR THE ACTS AND OMISSIONS OF ITS
AGENT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THAT
AGENCY.
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Ihe Lower Court's refusal to allow the jury to consider
the alleged agency relationship between Zions First National
Bank and the plaintiffs was highly prejudicial and amounted
to significant error. There was sufficient evidence to raise a
jury question on appellant's theory of agency, but the Court
ignored such evidence in its instructions to the jury and in the
manner in which it submitted the case on special interrogatories. The instructions and interrogatories treated the parties
as completely separate and had the effect of telling the jury
that there was nothing unusual about this banking transaction
This attitude of the Court was manifested early in the proceedings in the highly restrictive rulings on the admissibility
of evidence. Appellant was prevented from presenting considerable additional evidence which was probative on the issue of agency and other material relationships of the plaintiffs
and the Bank officers. (See point II of this brief). The net
effect of the Court's rulings and instructions was that the jury
had to consider the plaintiffs and the Bank as standing only
in the relationship of debtor and creditor and that one was
not responsible for the acts of the other. Also, the jury was
forced to view the acts of omissions of either as independent
from the acts or omissions of the other. As a result, appellant
was effectively denied the right to present the heart of his case
to the jury. The issue of agency was properly raised in the
pleadings by appellant, there was evidence to support the same,
and the defendant requested an instruction on agency. As
stated on page 22 of the Bank's brief, it is the duty of the
Court to present the theories of both parties to the jury. This
the Court failed to do.
The Bank has misunderstood and misstated Mr. Hunter's
position on the question of agency as contained in his brief.

3
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On Page 8 of its brief, the Bank interprets the appellant's
position in the following manner:
". . . Defendant argues that Zions First National
Bank, intervening plaintiff in this action, became the
agent of the plaintiffs for the sale of a security under
Utah Code Annotated, Section 6-1-22 (1) (b) (1953),
because it required express consent of the stockowner
before releasing any information about the stock in
question."
Such is not the position of Mr. Hunter and no such argument
is contained in his brief.
It is Mr. Hunter's position that the Bank became the
agent for the plaintiffs for the specific purpose of providing
appellant with the information on the stock of Universal Leasing Company and in that capacity, liability could be found
against both the Bank and the plaintiffs under the cited Utah
law. It is not contended that the Bank became the agent because it required the consent of the plaintiffs before giving
such information, but rather that it became the agent when
the plaintiffs directed it to give the information to the defendant and vested in it the corresponding authority to act
and it so acted.
Appellant has no real quarrel with the general conclusions of the legal authorities cited on the issue of agency in
the Bank's brief, although they certainly are not a full recitation of the law of agency. It is appellant's contention that
these authorities are consistent with his position and that the
question of agency should have been submitted to the jury.
While consent of the parties is necessary to the creation of an

4
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agency relationship, such consent may be expressed or implied.
Thus, we see in 2A C.J.S., Agency, Section 52, the following
language:
"The relation of agency need not depend upon express appointment and acceptance thereof, but may
be, and frequently is, implied from the words and conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the particular case. The law creates a relationship of principal and agent if the parties, in the conduct of their affairs actually place themselves in such a position as
requires the relationship to be inferred by the courts,
and if, from the facts and circumstances of the particular case, it appears that there was at least an implied
intention to create it, the relation may be held to exist,
notwithstanding a denial by the alleged principal, and
whether or not the parties understood it to be an
agency."
In the case of Presta v. Monmer, 146 A.2d 404, 145
Conn. 69A, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that a
vendor of an apartment building who referred a purchaser
to a woman to answer purchaser's questions as to certain
material facts made the woman his agent for the purpose of
answering the specific questions. This is closely analogous to
what the plaintiffs and Bank did. The evidence shows that
when Mr. Hunter contacted Mr. Peter Souvall, one of the
plaintiffs, regarding the possible purchase of Universal Leasing Company's securities, Mr. Souvall agreed that they wanted
to sell the stock, but informed Mr. Hunter that it was being
held by the Bank as collateral on a loan and that he would
have to go there to get the information he was seeking concerning the stock (R 43, 44, 47, 396, 397). Mr. Souvall told
Mr. Donald Bennett, one of the officers of the Bank, to give
Mr. Hunter whatever information about the stock the Bank had
5
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(R 183). Mr. Hunter went to the Bank for said information
and consulted about the stock with Mr. Bennett and also Mr.
John Langeland, Senior Vice-President of the Bank (R 183,
396,397).
While there is conflict in the evidence as to the information received by Mr. Hunter, the proper resolution of this
conflict was for the jury. There is no question that Mr. Hunter went to the Bank for the purpose of getting whatever financial information the Bank had on the stock. He was sent
there by the sellers of the stock and it is incredible that the
Bank now takes the position that its role in the entire transaction was immaterial to the culminated sale. Mr. Souvall
and the other plaintiffs knew the Bank had information to
give Mr. Hunter and they relied upon the Bank to do so.
This placed upon the Bank the duty to give accurate information to the appellant and to make full disclosure of all the
information it had. Whether or not the Bank complied with
this duty is a question which the jury should have decided.
There was sufficient evidence introduced in the lower court
to show that the Bank played a material role in the sale and
to submit the question of "whether or not the Bank violated
the Statute" to the jury. That evidence is discussed under
Point VI of this brief. It is reasonable to conclude that a fair
minded jury would find that the plaintiff directed and the
Bank consented to act as an agent for the purpose of giving
financial information to Mr. Hunter. It is also reasonable to
assume that in giving such a direction, plaintiffs retained a
certain amount of control over the Bank in this limited agency
relationship. Had the plaintiffs changed their minds and directed the Bank not to give any such information to Mr. Hun-
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ter, the Bank would have followed such a direction which is
evidence that it was subjecting itself to the control of plaintiffs.
It only acted upon the authority vested in it by the plaintiffs.
The failure of the Court to submit this issue to the jury
deprived appellant of the basic part of his statutory defense
and counterclaim against both the plaintiffs and the Bank. It
is appellant's contention that the plaintiffs should be charged
not only for their own material omissions, but also for the misrepresentations and material omissions of the Bank. It is also
Mr. Hunter's position that the Bank is primarily liable under
Section 6 l - l - 2 2 ( l ) ( b ) as an agent who materially aided in
the sale of the security.
The Bank has responded on Pages 13 and 14 of its brief
by saying, "Under any theory, the jury's decision would have
foreclosed the judgment in defendant's favor." The Bank bases
its conclusion upon the answers the jury gave to Interrogatories
11 through 14. These interrogatories were submitted on the
question of the commission of common law fraud by the Bank.
They were submitted under the qualifying instruction that
Hunter had the burden of proving the issues answered therein
by clear and convincing evidence. As pointed out in appellant's brief, the elements of statutory fraud and common law
fraud and the burden of proof in each is different and it cannot be said that the jury ever considered the elements of statutory fraud as k related to the Bank in its individual or agency
capacity. In addition to this, as will be seen in Point II of
the brief, the Court's erroneous rulings excluding material
evidence prevented the jury from properly considering the
elements of Mr. Hunter's common law defense against the
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Bank and the Souvalls. Other errors of the court considered
under this Point and in Points II, III and IV will show that
the court made it impossible for the jury to properly try the
issues in appellant's statutory defense against the Souvalls.
Therefore, contrary to the position of the Bank, under no
theory were the issues properly directed to or considered by
the jury. Further discussion on this matter and also the right
of appellant to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence
will be discussed hereafter.
POINT II
SUBSTANTIAL AND PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED BY THE LOWER COURT IN EXCLUDING
FROM THE EVIDENCE DEFENDANTS PROPOSED EXHIBIT 7-D, ENTITLED "SBA LOAN APPLICATION."
The Respondent-Bank argues that proposed Exhibit 7-D
was irrelevant and immaterial and was not probative of any
fact in issue and therefore, the court properly excluded it
from evidence. The Respondent further argued that there was
nothing improper about the SBA loan. In order to support
those points, the Bank made numerous misstatements of fact
that are not supported by the record and incorrectly stated the
Defendant's arguments as to its admissibility.
The facts show that the SBA loan application (proposed
Exhibit 7-D is the application that included the Universal
Leasing stock as part of the loan collateral) was prepared in
August of 1969 and not in June as contended by the Bank
(R35-36). John Langeland and Donald Bennett of the Bank
assisted Pete Souvall in the preparation of the Loan application (R-88). At the time, John Langeland and T. Bowering
Woodbury, a Vice-President of the Bank, were both officers,
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members of the Board of Directors, and members of the Executive Committees of both borrowing corporations (R-28,
80-83). For these and other reasons, the Bank was charged
with knowledge of the contents of the SBA loan application.
It formed the basis upon which the loan to the plaintiffs was
ultimately made. The appellant's agreement to purchase the
securities of Universal Leasing Company was the culmination
of a series of transactions that started with the SBA loan. It is
the appellant's position that these transactions cannot be isolated from one another as the Bank contends. The defendantappellant will point out how those transactions, beginning with
the joint participation of the plaintiffs and Bank officers in
the fraudulent procurement of the SBA loan, became a significant part of the circumstances that led up to and surrounded
their sale of certain items of the loan collateral to Hunter.
To begin with, the Bank incorrectly stated in its brief
that it is not contended that there was anything illegal or improper about the SBA loan. Apparently, the Bank has chosen
to ignore Pages 14 through 16 of the appellant's brief. The
loan was granted on the basis of numerous misstatements and
omissions that were jointly made by the plaintiff and the Bank
in the application R-28, 80, 83-84, 88, 144-145, 148 Ex.
7-D. It is contended that those misstatements and omissions
in the application were of such a gross nature as to possibly
subject the preparers thereof to the criminal sanctions of 15
15 U.S.C, 645 which makes it unlawful to prepare and present a false loan application to the Small Business Administration.

9
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Following their fraudulent procurement and use of the
SBA loan, the plaintiff corporations made only one monthly
payment of $4,798.00 and went into bankruptcy R-92, 219.
The joint participation of the plaintiffs and Bank officers in
the above described activities left them with substantial mutual
problems to solve. The Bank Officers were deeply concerned
that their prior involvement in illegal activities might be uncovered and create other severe problems for them. They were
aware that the values of the assets, as shown in the SBA application, were grossly overstated. Their analysis of Universal
Leasing to determine if it was worthy of credit revealed that
the only way that Universal Leasing would qualify for financing was strictly on the strength of the lessee. That fact, along
with their awareness of the effect that Dinner Table's going
broke would have on Universal Leasing, gave them knowledge
that Universal Leasing was in serious financial trouble. They
were also aware that some of the other assets were improperly valued, including some of the leases that they had pledged
on the SBA loan that were very delinquent when the application was submitted. Souvalls were also concerned about those
problems and that they might lose their homes if a solution
couldn't be found.
When Hunter appeared on the scene inquiring about
Universal Leasing stock, the plaintiffs and Bank officers devised a plan whereby Hunter would become the solution to
their problems. The plan provided the way for Souvalls to
get back their homes and have their loan paid back to Zions
and the SBA with funds derived from the sale of the Highland
Drive property and the worthless Universal Leasing stock. The
success of the plan required material misstatements and omissions on the part of the Bank officers as well as the Souvalls.
10
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The willingness of the Bank Officers to make misstatements and material omissions to solve problems which would
mutually benefit the plaintiffs and themselves and to make
further misstatements and omissions to prevent those prior
illegal activities from coming to light is amply demonstrated
by their inconsistent and conflicting testimonies concerning
their knowledge of and participation in the SBA loan. It is
the defendant-appellant's contention that the loan application
and related testimony should have been admitted as evidence
and that he should have been able to use the application in
impeaching their testimonies. In addition to that, it is submitted that the appellant should have been allowed to develop further evidence about their true participation in the
activities involving the SBA loan. Some of the irregularities
of the SBA loan and examples of their related conflicting testimonies are discussed below and should have been admitted as
circumstances of the Bank Officers that had a bearing on their
credibility as witnesses.
1. The failure to set forth in ITEM 2 of "Appellant's
Statement" of the SBA loan application, the fact that both
Langeland and Bennett of the Bank assisted in the preparation of the loan application R88. Pete Souvall testified
that both Bennett and Langeland assisted him in filling out
that application R88. Langeland testified in his deposition
that Bennett assisted Souvall but in court said that the Bank
can't assist in filling out an application to the SBA p. 19 of
deposition R220-221. In court, both Langeland and Bennett
denied that they assisted in the preparation of the SBA loan
application R 220-221, 144.
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2. The failure to disclose in ITEM 3 the fact that Mr.
T. Bowering Woodbury and Mr. John Langeland of the Bank
were officers, directors and members of the Executive Committees of both borrowing corporations R 28, 80, 83-84,
143-145. Bennett testified in his deposition that he was
aware of only one relationship that Langeland had with Dinner
Table. He testified that Langeland was a small stockholder
of Dinner Table and that fact was shown in the SBA loan application, p. 8 of deposition. That fact was not shown in
the application Exhibit 7-D. In court, Bennett further contradicted his deposition and testified that he was aware that
Langeland was a director of Dinner Table when the loan was
made R 143. He couldn't explain why that wasn't shown
in the application R 144-6.
The responding Bank has incorrectly cited portions of
the testimony of Mr. Peter Souvall as evidence for the statement in their brief that the Bank admits that certain of its
officers were also officers of the borrowing corporations at
the time they procurred the SBA loan p. 16 of their brief.
However, the testimony of the Bank officers at the trial contradicted Pete Souvall's testimony. Langeland, Senior VicePresident of the Bank, emphatically denied being an officer
or on the Executive Committee of either Dinner Table or
S & F Supply Company, or being a director of S & F R 220.
It is appellant's contention that the Bank officers were
very concerned about their heavy involvement in irregular and
illegal banking practices and attempted to convey the impression to the court that their only interests and motives in seeing the stock sold were those of a bankers. The only relation12
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ship besides debtor-creditor that Langeland admitted to was
being a reluctant director of Dinner Table R 220-222.
3. The failure to disclose the actual use of the loan proceeds in ITEM 8 or in Exhibit B of the application R 148.
Exhibit 7-D shows that in excess of $175,000.00 of the $200,000.00 loan proceeds were to be used as working capital Ex.
7-D item 6. Bennett admitted that $73,000.00 of the loan
proceeds went to pay off other unrelated loans at Zions Bank
which loans were personally guaranteed by the Souvalls
R 147, 148. Bennett admitted that this was not revealed
to the SBA in the loan application R 148. This was contrary to his deposition in which he testified that the use of
those proceeds were shown in the SBA loan application p. 7
deposition. Langeland's testimony in his deposition was inconsistent on the use of proceeds as well p. 11, 16-18 deposition. When the appellant attempted to go further to show
that the balance of the loan proceeds were also misused for
their mutual benefit, the matter was objected to by counsel
for the plaintiffs and the Court sustained the objection and
in effect ruled that the use of the loan proceeds was not material to the issues of the present case R 149-151.
4. The improper evaluation of the assets which were
pledged as collateral on the loan. The Bank used Swenson's
offer to place a value of $100,000.00 on the stock to procure
the SBA loan R 159, 167, 186. Souvall testified that the
Universal Leasing stock was a material consideration in the
SBA approving the loan R 36. The plaintiffs and the Bank
officers stated that the only information that was significant
at any time, in their assessment of the value of the Universal
13
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Leasing stock, was Swenson's offer. Both the plaintiffs and
Bank officers testified that it was a valid offer and would have
been valid even at the time the stock was sold to Hunter. If
it was valid, it was much better than Hunters offer, since
Swenson's offer was for $100,000.00 for the stock and they
had Psarras' offer of $35,000.00 for some of the other items.
Therefore, they would have had $135,000.00 and still have
the restaurant inventory to sell R 199-200. Yet, no one
ever approached Mr. Swenson about accepting his offer even
though the evidence showed: (1) they had contact with Mr.
Swenson at times when the loan was in default and the collateral was for sale R 187, 200-202, 208-209, 226, 229,
250; and (2) if the Swenson offer was valid, it would have
been a much more lucrative offer than given by Mr. Hunter
R 199.
The truth of the matter is that because of their involvements with the plaintiff corporations, they were aware that
Universal Leasing was in serious financial trouble. They were
also aware that Mr. Swenson was an officer, director, sizable
stockholder and on the payroll of Universal Leasing and was,
therefore, very much aware of the financial problems of Universal R 208, 605-609, 617-618. This explains the reason
that they never attempted to sell the stock to Mr. Swenson.
The Bank contended in its brief that the court properly
excluded proposed Exhibit 7-D from evidence because it was
not probative of any fact in issue. The defendant-appellant
maintains that the admission of proposed Exhibit 7-D was absolutely essential to allow the jury to properly consider numerous disputed facts and issues that were material to his defense of fraud.
14
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The SBA application and related testimonies were material to numerous disputed facts and issues including the following:
(1) Relationships between Plaintiffs and Bank Officers.
One of those facts in dispute is "what were the true relationships that existed between the plaintiffs and Bank officers that
motivated their actions in the sale of assets to Hunter." It is
the defendant-appellant's contention that Exhibit 7-D should
have been admitted to establish those relationships since they
were far different than the debtor-creditor relationship claimed
and gave rise to motivations and knowledge far different from
what would be expected from a normal debtor-creditor, i.e.,
banker-client, relationship. The loan application, combined
with the limited inquires that the defendant was able to make,
established their relationship to be one of joint participants in
illegal and fraudulent activities in their procurement and use
of the SBA loan and were heavily involved in the affairs of
the borrowing corporations. That relationship left them with
substantial mutual problems to solve and the plaintiffs and
Bank officers worked together to solve those problems in the
fraudulent sale to Mr. Hunter. Their willingness to solve
those problems by means of material misstatements and omissions is demonstrated by their material misstatements and
omissions in the SBA loan application and further misstatements and omissions in their depositons and testimonies in
the trial.
(2) Scienter. The fact is that the borrowing corporation
had substantial intervening business relationships and adverse
financial dealings with Universal Leasing. It will be shown
under Point III of this brief that those relationships and
15
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dealings were the major factor that caused Universal Leasing
to go broke. Therefore, the extent to which the Bank officers
were involved with the borrowing corporations in relationships other than debtor-creditor, is significant in establishing
their knowledge of said dealings.
(3) Agency. The relationship discussed above provided additional reasons why the plaintiffs might use, and have, the
cooperation of the Bank officers in providing information on
the Universal Leasing stock to Hunter.
(4) Intentional misstatements and omissions. In the pleadings, the defendant pleaded that the plaintiffs and Bank officers worked together in a plan to defraud him. It was necessary for the jury to understand the relationships, involvements and mutual problems of the plaintiffs and Bank officers in order to understand the circumstances that motivated
their actions in their fraudulent sale to Hunter.
This is not merely a breach of contract action, but involves serious allegations of mutual participation in fraudulent practices. It is a well accepted rule of law that great latitude is permitted in the introduction of evidence in cases involving fraud 37 CJ.S. Fraud, Section 104. In the 1955
Idaho case of Cooper v. Westco Builders, 281 P. 2d 669, it
was held to be error in a fraud action to deny the admissibility
of a document which would only be pertinent to showing a
course of conduct bearing on the issue of scienter and intent
and would not be directly otherwise relevant to the transaction in question. The Idaho Court then cites the general rule
that much latitude should be allowed in the admission of evidence tending to show fraud.
16
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The Court committed further error when it refused admission of the SBA loan application after the subject had
been introduced by the testimony of Mr. Peter Souvall
R 31-37. The Bank has stated that Mr. Souvall's testimony
went only to the existence and execution of the document
and did not go into any of the particular thereof. On the contrary, the record clearly shows that Mr. Souvall testified in
detail concerning the applicants, the identification and valuation of much of the collateral of the loan, and to the fact that
the proceeds were to be used for working capital R 31-37.
Thus, the plaintiffs were allowed to use the information contained in the loan application for their purposes without
subjecting themselves to the evidentiary liability of the proposed exhibit.
These errors are but further examples of the way Mr.
Hunter was prevented from presenting his defense. Not only
did the Court, in effect, tell the jury that the plaintiffs and
the Bank were independent of one another, but it prevented
the appellant from producing evidence that would show they
were clearly motivated to work together to protect their
mutual business interests and to conceal highly irregular
and even illegal activities. Appellant was also prevented from
showing how the individual plaintiffs and the individual Bank
officers mutually benefited by their deception. These are
legitimate areas of inquiry which certainly have relevance in
this type of a case. Perhaps the attitude of the trial judge is
best reflected by a statement he made after the voir dire of
the jury,
"I know that guy that said they didn't keep their
records straight, Brother, I've never found the Bank
was wrong yet. I have been wrong, but not the Bank."
R7.
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Proposed Exhibit 7-D and related testimony was material to
numerous disputed facts and issues and the court committed
substantial and prejudicial error by excluding it from evidence.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS NO. 17 AND 19 WHEN
IT FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT LIABILITY UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES
ACT CAN BE PREDICATED UPON AN OMISSION AS
OPPOSED TO A MERE HALF-TRUTH.
The Lower Court failed to properly instruct the jury that
silence when one has the duty to speak is actionable under
the cited statute. The Court only partially quoted the statute
in Instruction No. 15 and then improperly interpreted the
same in Instructions 17 and 19. In Instruction No. 15, the
Court failed to cite the portion of the statute which refers to
the liability of an agent for material misrepresentations and
omissions. This was discussed fully in Point I. In Instruction
No. 17, the Court improperly stated the elements of the statute which will be explained under Point IV of this brief. Subsection A that follows will show the Respondent's claim that,
"the Court properly instructed the jury on omissions, when
the instructions as a whole were considered'' is incorrect. Subsection B is a response to the Respondent's incorrect claim that
the defendant-appellant does not claim that the Souvalls were
guilty of any material omissions.
A
The Bank appears to have recognized the problems with
Instruction No. 17, but states that the Court's instructions
should not be judged by isolated statements contained in them,
but must be considered as a whole. That being the case, we
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next refer to Instruction No. 19 which is the other instruction interpreting the statute. Instruction No. 19 defines what
is meant by material facts. The Court failed to explain how
material facts may be either material misstatements or material omissions, but rather defined them as:
". . . Those fundamental, important facts concerning
the financial condition of the corporation or particular
reasons why such stock should be purchased."
The clear inference of such language is that a material
fact must be an affirmative statement about a material matter.
In Instruction No. 19, the Court also stated,
"Mere opinions or conclusions which do not incorporate material facts are considered to be sales talk,
or irrelevant and immaterial to the part forming his
opinion as to whether or not he should buy or sell the
stock."
In effect, the jury was told to disregard any representations
which did not constitute material facts. However, the clear
language of the statute states that if one makes such statements which are misleading under the circumstances there is
a duty to disclose all of the material facts about the securities
in question.
The case law referred to in both appellant's original
brief and the Bank's brief supports the proposition that the
construction of the language of the Federal Act which is comparable to the Utah statute, should not be technical and restrictive, but should be flexible to effectuate the remedial purposes of the statute. See cases cited in appellant's and respondent's brief under Point III and also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 195, 84 S.Ct. at 284.
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In most of the cases referenced above, the fact situations
were such that it was not really necessary to determine whether
mere omissions, standing alone, were sufficient to support a
finding of liability under the Federal statute. In any transaction, it is almost always possible to find some representation
which when considered in the light of the other circumstances
of the case (including important omissions), would have to
be considered misleading. It could be well argued that such
is the case with the plaintiffs and the Bank in their dealings
with Mr. Hunter. Certainly Mr. Souvall by implication made
statements which, standing alone, were misleading. The very
fact that he represented the stock was for sale infers that it
has value when in fact it did not. His act of sending Mr.
Hunter to the Bank to get information about the stock was
misleading and Mr. Hunter had the right to rely upon the
reasonable inference that he would get accurate and reliable
information from the bank.
B
The Bank's representation in its brief that Mr. Hunter
does not claim that the Souvalls made any omissions as to any
material fact is not true. There are two major categories of
Souvalls omissions claimed by the appellant. The first is that
with which Souvall was charged by Law. The facts show that
Mr. Peter Souvall was a Director of Universal Leasing when
all of the financial statements were prepared on Universal
Leasing and Universal Rockwell that could have been available to Mr. Hunter up through the time of sale R 118, 13P,
14P, 18P, 23D. He is charged under the law with knowledge of those statements. The three conflicting 8-31-69 statements (13P, 14P, 18P) and the 11-30-69 statement (23D)
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were false, misleading, and did not represent the true financial condition of the Company as of their respective dates R
268-270, 375-377 & 25P, 26P. A financial statement purports to reflect the status of the company on the books and
records of the corporation. These statements didn't since the
books of the company from 3-31-69 forward were not even
posted until May, 1970 R 376. Those statements showed
that the company was making money and had sufficient current assets to meet their current liabilities. The books of the
company, after posting, showed that they had lost $2,000.00
by 8-31-69 and $34,000.00 by November and that their true
net worth was not even 60% of the net worth shown on most
of the false statements R 375, 377, Exhibit 3IP. The three
8-31-69 statements (Exhibits 13P, 14P & 18P) were prepared
for management (including Peter Souvall, a director at that
time) because management knew that Universal Leasing was
in dire trouble and they needed a financial statement to use
in making an acquisition in hopes of bailing themselves out
of the water R 604-605, 609-610. At least one of those
false financials were subsequently delivered to Zions to obtain additional financing R 606, 607. Hunter got 23D
from Eames and 18P from the Bank and used them in concluding that Universal Leasing was in good shape and progressing in a good manner R 397-398.
The second area of omissions claimed against the Souvalls are those which put Souvall under a duty to speak. The
plaintiffs had substantial adverse financial dealings and business relationships with Universal Leasing which were not
disclosed to the appellant. In November, 1969, Mark Eames
(who was president of Universal Leasing and director of Dinner Table), attended a Dinner Table meeting at which Peter
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Souvall and John Langeland were present. Eames presented
a letter from Universal Leasing's Attorney to Dinner Table
demanding the $50,000.00 that Dinner Table had taken from
the working capital of Universal Leasing be returned to Universal Leasing R 672. Souvall said that $50,000.00 was
paid back to Universal Leasing R 205. The facts show
Universal Leasing requested its $50,000.00 back but Dinner
Table was bankrupt R 684, 685. Therefore, instead of
giving the money back, they gave Universal Leasing the rights
to franchise Burger-in-The-Round which proved to be worthless R 684, 685. At that meeting, Langeland and Eames
had a heated discussion in which John Langeland explained:
(1) that Universal Leasing was not financially capable of
handling any more of the leases that Dinner Table was generating; and (2) the current financial condition of Universal
Leasing. Eames concluded from that discussion that Langeland appeared to have knowledge of the financial condition
of Universal Leasing at that time R 672, 673. Universal
Leasing was in serious financial trouble, because their cash
position was short and the delinquency position of their accounts receivable was very bad R 604-605, 609-610, 617.
Subsequently, Eames was informed that plaintiffs were
going to declare bankruptcy. He kept in constant contact
with them trying to collect the sizable receivable they had
with Universal Leasing R 618. When Eames was informed
that Hunter might buy Souvalls' stock, he felt that if Hunter
did, it would be to the betterment of Universal Leasing since
Hunter's bailing the Souvalls out at Zions Bank would put the
Souvalls in a position where they could possibly honor their
obligations to Universal Leasing. Eames said, "That was
the whole incentive behind the whole program" R. 618,
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619. It was this incentive that caused the Board of Directors
of Universal to remove the legend on Souvalls' stock (R 673)
and for Eames not to disclose to Hunter the business and financial dealings of Dinner Table and Universal Leasing and the
resultant adverse effects on the financial condition of Universal Leasing R 618-620.
After Hunter purchased the stock, Eames was still motivated and resisted putting out any financial statements that
would reflect the true condition of the Company R 365.
Hunter threatened suit R 483. Finally in May, 1970, Universal Rockwell retained Robert Apgood for that purpose. He
had to post the books from 3-31-69 forward R 375-377.
He testified that the books showed that the leases that Dinner
Table had with Universal Leasing were delinquent R 318319. Eames testified that those leases which were in default amounted to approximately $300,000.00 R. 619620. On one of these leases, he discovered that the
equipment didn't exist R 683. By the end of May, Apgood
had prepared a financial statement for their year end, which
was March 31, 1970. The statement showed that Universal
Rockwell had lost $126,000.00 and had $736,419.63 in current liabilities and only $445,913.00 in current assets R
548-549. Eames testified that the merger with North Star
Marine Sales was rescinded because the working capital of
Universal Rockwell had been depleted in Dinner Table and
that put Universal Rockwell in a position where they could
not make payments on any of the assets of North Star Marine
Sales that were encumbered R 548, 361. The facts show
that the plaintiffs not only knew Universal Rockwell was in
serious financial trouble, they were the major factor that
caused it.
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Approximately one month before Mr. Hunter entered
negotiations with the Souvalls and the Bank, they agreed to
sell all of the items that Mr. Hunter purchased for $133,500.00 to Mr. Psarras for $35,000.00 R 100. This agreement with Psarras for $35,000.00 included the shares of Universal Leasing stock R 100, 101. That sale to Psarras was
being held up prior to the time Hunter entered the picture
because Psarras needed a little time to come up with the
$35,000.00 and when Souvall discussed the pending sale with
the Bank and SBA, they told him that he needed to get a
disclaimer from the Bankruptcy Court before the sale could
be completed R 41-42, 59, 234-236. Therefore, when Mr.
Hunter appeared on the scene inquiring about the Universal
Leasing Stock, Souvall told Hunter that there were other assets
for sale and that they had pending sales of those assets to
Psarras and others R 47-48, 102. Hunter was told by
Souvall and his attorney that the sale of the stock to him
and the sale of other assets to others had to be combined in
one sale to him to satisfy the Bank and allow the Bank to get
a disclaimer from the Bankruptcy Court on the items that were
to be purchased by Psarras (excluding the stock that he was
getting) and the restaurant inventory R 109, 448, 454, 232,
234-236, 243-245. The Souvalls informed Hunter that the
price that had been agreed upon in the pending sale they
had with Psarras was $35,000.00. They did not inform Hunter that the sale they had pending with Psarras was to have
included the Universal Leasing stock R 48-49. At the
same meeting Hunter signed the 3-9-70 purchase contract (Exhibit 3P), he signed another contract selling all the assets he
purchased, except for a nominal amount of inventory and the
stock, to Psarras for $35,000.00 R 101, 102, 103, 398-400,
537.
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The very fact that the plaintiffs and the Bank were willing to sell the stock and the other items to Mr. Psarras for
$35,000.00 and then shortly thereafter sold essentially the
same items to Mr. Psarras for $35,000.00 without the stock,
indicates that they placed no value whatever on the stock.
In addition to the omissions of the plaintiffs of not telling
Hunter that they knew Universal Leasing was in serious financial trouble and the fact that they had financial dealings and
relationships with Universal Leasing which could and did
cause Universal Leasing to go broke, they were guilty of additional omissions that paved the way for Hunter's deception.
The only two sources from which Hunter received information were Mark Eames and the Bank. The Souvalls
omitted to tell Hunter that (1) the relationship they had
with the Bank went far beyond that of creditor-debtor as discussed in Point II of this brief and (2) that the relationships
they had with Universal Rockwell included a substantial
creditor-debtor relationship. This allowed a situation to be
created in which Hunter was getting information from sources
which Hunter had no reason to believe might be biased.
However, these sources in reality, had very strong motives to
provide Hunter with false information and to conceal the true
financial condition of the company from Hunter.
The omissions of the plaintiffs combined with the omissions of and false information given by the officers of the
Bank and Universal Leasing, left Hunter with a picture that
Universal Leasing was in good financial condition and its
stock was a good buy. The effect and legal consequences of
those omissions under the statute should have been considered
by the jury. The jury was precluded from so doing by the
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following errors of the Court: (1) The Court failed to properly construe the evidence which was presented; (2) The
Court failed to instruct the jury on the agency relationship
between the plaintiffs and Bank officers; (3) The Court refused to allow the defendant to introduce additional material
evidence on the question of agency and other relationships
of the plaintiffs and Bank officers; (4) The Court failed to
properly instruct the jury on the legal consequences of omissions under the statute where there is a duty of speak; (5)
The Court failed to properly instruct on what is required in
the way of a statement to make those omissions a violation of
the statute. Thus because of the court's improper rulings,
neither the omissions of the plaintiffs or the Bank were considered by the jury as having any consequence.
It has long been a principle at common law that silence
may be actionable fraud under certain circumstances. As security transactions multiplied and as it became apparent that
it was difficult to apply general common law fraud principles
to those transactions, Congress and State Legislatures enacted
liberal statutes to control security dealings. It would be a
strange result indeed if construction of these statutes made it
more difficult to enforce than even the common law. In the
instant case, those important jury questions were never decided because of the numerous errors of the court. Those
errors amounted to substantial and prejudicial error.
POINT IV
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
WHEN IT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S STATUTORY DEFENSE
AND CONCERNING THE BURDEN OF PROOF.
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The respondent argued that there was no evidence presented to the Lower Court that tends to support a finding
that the Bank was guilty of a violation of Section 61-1-22
(1) (b) because the Bank was not aware of any material
information relating to the financial condition of Universal
Leasing other than that provided to the defendant-appellant.
The respondent has apparently chosen to ignore the facts that
were presented at the trial and also to ignore the effect of
the Court's exclusionary rulings. The facts that showed the
creation of the agency relationship were fully discussed under
Point I and will not be repeated hereunder. The liability of
the Bank results from acts which they committed as an agent
for the sellers. These acts constituted both material misrepresentations and material omissions. Not only do these acts
attach directly to the Bank, but they also should be imputed
to its principal, the plaintiffs, as a basis for liability on their
part. The failure of the court to instruct on these points was
prejudicial error. These acts and omissions of the Bank will
be discussed under Subsection A and the errors in the instructions and interrogatories will be discussed under Subsection B.
A
The statute, would have required the Bank to sustain
the burden of proof that it did not know, or in the exercise of
reasonable care could not know, of the existence of the untruths or omissions claimed. The sole evidence presented to
the lower court that would have gone towards sustaining that
burden of proof were certain statements made by Langeland
and Bennett of the Bank as discussed below. The facts regarding the creation of the agency relation were in dispute.
The Souvalls told Hunter that their information on the stock
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was at the Bank and sent Hunter there to get it R 396.
Pete Sou vail called Bennett and told the Bank to give "Hunter whatever information the Bank had" R 283. When
Hunter arrived at the Bank, Bennett said that Hunter asked
him for whatever financial information the Bank had on Universal Leasing R 160. The issue as to what information
the Bank gave Hunter is a matter of heavy dispute and should
have been presented to the jury under the guidelines of the
statute.
Bennett claims that he discussed two conflicting 8-31-69
financial statements on Universal Leasing (13p & l4p) with
Hunter and explained that the statements showed that Universal Leasing owned Universal Rockwell. He also discussed
the difference in amounts in assets and that he didn't know
which statement was correct R 160, 161, 162, 667. He
said that was all he discussed because that was all Hunter
was looking for R 667. He said that he was aware that
Hunter asked for a financial statement but didn't recall
whether he gave Hunter one or not R 153. Bennett testified that he told Hunter to audit the Company since the Bank
was relying upon sources other than financial statements for
their value R 162. He did not recall discussing Universal
Leasing with Hunter thereafter R 184, 185.
Langeland said that he was aware that Hunter had a financial statement on Universal Leasing and that Hunter came
into Langeland's office with the statement in his hand, and
said to Langeland, "I know about the financial condition of
Universal Leasing." When Langeland was asked what
prompted Hunter to say that, Langeland said that he concluded from his conversation with Hunter that "Hunter was
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concerned at that time about the financial condition of the
Company that was a small part of the overall Company in
which he was buying stock" R 633, 634. He said that he
told Hunter that "the Bank has no reason to have a financial
statement that they had to rely on in their files on Universal
Leasing" R 638, 639. He claimed that he further advised
Hunter to check the books and records to make sure the financial statement was correct R 638, 639- Langeland said Hunter returned two days later for a second meeting and told
Langeland that he looked at the assets and the accounts of the
Company and nothing was fundamentally wrong with the
Company R 640. Langeland said that no one other than
Hunter and himself were at those meetings R 637, 640.
All of the above testimony of Langeland took place on the
last day of the trial R 636-642.
Langeland had testified earlier in the trial and in his deposition that he did not have any meetings where he was
alone with Hunter which contradicts the above testimony
R 238, 239. He also testified that Hunter did not say anything about the merger wtih North Star Marine Sales which
is also not consistent with the above testimony R 639-640.
Hunter claims that Bennett gave him one 8-31-69 financial statement on Universal Leasing (18p) and told him that
was all the information they had and did not discuss 13p or
l4p with him R 513. He also testified that neither Bennett
nor Langeland gave him any other financial information on
Universal Leasing and that the Bank officers did not advise
him that the statement he received might be incorrect or that
he should investigate it further R 507, 513, 550.
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The claims by the two Bank officers and the claims by
the defendant-appellant recited above represent the two sides
of the issue as to what information was given to Hunter by
the Bank. Those facts were in dispute and that issue would
have been submitted to the jury to decide under the conditions
prescribed by the statute. The Court failed to do so. The Court
also failed to allow the jury to consider the legal consequences
of the omissions of the Bank under either statutory or common
law fraud. The claims of the Bank that "the Bank was not
cognizant of any material information of the financial condition of Universal Leasing that they did not convey to Hunter"
and "they answered all Hunter's questions about the stock"
are not supported by the record p. 25 and 4 Bank's brief.
Hunter asked the Bank for whatever financial information they
had on Universal Leasing R 160. The only information
that the Bank claimed to give Hunter was that which was
discussed in the disputed facts above.
The record shows that the Bank was aware of a great deal
more material financial information on Universal Leasing
than even that which they claimed to have discussed with him.
Universal Leasing was a customer of the Bank when Hunter
first approached the Bank to inquire about the Universal Leasing stock. It had been a customer since prior to the summer
of 1968. It had some loans outstanding and had applied for
others when Hunter approached the Bank. R. 141-143, 195.
Bennett was head of the credit department for the Bank.
He testified that he requested the Spanish Fork Branch of the
Bank to send him some financial statements on Universal
Leasing as additional information on the financing that Universal Leasing was requesting R. 142, 195. He testified that

30
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

he was concerned about what the value of the stock might
be outside of Swenson's offer and called Eames to inquire
about the same R 162. He wrote a memo to himself about
that conversation which stated that Eames told him that the
8-31-69 financial statement sent up from Spanish Fork was inaccurately prepared R 163, Ex. I6p.
The value of the stock and the credit worthiness of Universal Leasing would have varied greatly, depending which,
if either, of those financial statements were correct. Yet he did
not ask Eames which 8-31-69 statement was correct and he
was not concerned which, if either, was correct since he was
relying on Swenson's offer for their source of value of the
stock R 186. Bennett testified that he discussed two of the
conflicting 8-31-69 statements with Langeland R 190.
Langeland testified that Bennett did not discuss those two
conflicting statements with him, but that he was aware that
the Spanish Fork Branch of the Bank had sent up one financial
statement of Universal Leasing R 229, 230, 643. He later
contradicted this and testified that he was not aware of where
Bennett got any financial statements on Universal Leasing and
knew that his office did not have any financial statements on
Universal Leasing R 639.
The only way that the Bank would loan money to Universal Leasing was on the strength of the Lessee, not on the
strength of Universal Leasing R 645, 646. The Bank officers
had substantial involvement with the plaintiff corporations
and those corporations had substantial adverse financial dealings with Universal Leasing which were the major factors that
caused them to go broke. See Point III of this Brief. The Bank
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was aware that Universal Leasing was in serious financial
trouble. They omitted to convey the important financial information discussed above to Hunter. Those omissions amounted
to a violation of the statute. There was sufficient evidence presented on this issue, but the court failed to submit it to the jury.
B
Even in the instructions which the Court did give, there
were numerous errors which compounded the confusion in
the jury. The following is an itemized discussion of these errors:
1. In Instruction No. 6, the Court gave the standard
instruction on burden of proof being by the preponderance of
the evidence. Preponderance of the evidence was defined in
Instruction No. 5. In a case of this type, where there are various standards for burden of proof depending on the issue
being considered, it was error to give Instruction No. 6 since
it tells the jury that whenever it considers burden of proof
it should consider it as meaning proof by a preponderance of
the evidence.
2. In Instruction No, 21, the Court gives an opposite
general instruction to the effect that the jury is required to
assume that all men are fair and honest in their dealings until
the contrary is clearly and convincingly proven by the evidence. Thus, we see the jury is given two general instructions
on burden of proof, one being by a preponderance of the evidnce and the other being by clear and convincing evidence.
The jury possibly thought that Hunter had to prove anything
relating to the Souvalls lack of fairness or honesty by clear and
convincing evidence.
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3. In Instruction No. 31, the jury is instructed that Mr.
Hunter has the burden of proving his statutory defense against
the plaintiffs. The clear language of the statute is that the only
burden which Mr. Hunter has with regard thereto is to prove
that he did not know the truth of the misstatement or omissions claimed or in the exercise of reasonable care could not
have known. He did this and the evidence to that effect was
undisputed R 397-403. The statute placed a burden upon
the Souvalls to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
they did not know or in the exercise of reasonable care, could
not have known of the misstatement or omission claimed. The
court did not require Souvall to meet that burden, instead they
erroneously placed it on Hunter. Based on the evidence presented, Souvall would not have met the burden. This error
alone would justify reversal or, at least, the granting of a new
trial.
4. Instruction No. 17 states that intention and scienter is
an element of statutory fraud which is clearly not the case.
This point has been fully discussed in appellant's original brief.
5. Instruction No. 18, which is an instruction on the
elements of common law fraud, completely overlooks the consideration that silence, when one has a duty to speak, may be
the basis of actionable fraud.
6. Instruction No. 19 also fails to define the meaning
of "misleading statements" and fails to show how they relate
to "material facts" as defined in said instruction. It also fails
to make clear that material facts may be either material representations or material omissions.
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The above errors were individually and collectively prejudicial to appellant's right to fair trial. 5 A CJ.S. Appeal and
Error, Section 1763 (3) at page 1200 states as follows:
"It is regarded as reversible error when the instruction places the burden on the wrong party, or places
on the proper party a greater burden than the law
requires, or fails to require the necessary degree of
proof, or requires him to assume the burden of proving matters which he need not prove to establish his
case or defense, or does not require him to carry the
burden of proving all that is necessary."
In addition to the above mentioned mistakes in the instructions and the others referred to in other parts of the brief,
the Court's interrogatories were highly confusing and misleading. The jury was not asked if the Bank made any material
omissions either as it would apply to their statutory liability
or the charge of common law fraud. There were no interrogatories on the question of agency and its varied ramifications
upon the evidence as heretofore explained. In several of the
interrogatories, there were multiple questions in one interrogatory which makes it difficult to know just what the jury was
answering. Examples of these have been pointed out in appellant's original brief. Also, as pointed out in appellant's brief,
there was no reason for the giving of Interrogatories Nos. 21,
22, 23, 24 and 25. It is difficult to really know what the jury
did decide in the case because of the confusion in the instructions and the interrogatories and because of the failure to
allow the appellant to develop his case. The Bank has contended that the interrogatories and instructions are clear when
viewed as a whole, but it is appellant's contention that they are
even more confusing in their entirety than when read individually.
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The Court should have allowed appellant to amend his
pleadings to conform to the evidence at the close of the case.
It is recognized that as a general rule this is within the sound
discretion of the Court, however, when viewed with the numerous other prejudicial errors of the Court, it can be seen as a
definite abuse of discretion to not allow such an amendment.
The Bank contends that it would not have been fair to subject
them to the theory of statutory fraud since they had prepared
only to meet the charge of common law fraud. The Bank can
hardly claim to be surprised on this point, since the issues of
statutory fraud were clearly part of the pleadings against plaintiffs and the pleadings did allege an agency relation between
the plaintiffs and the Bank. If there was any such surprise, it
can certainly be corrected by a new trial which is deemed necessary because of the other numerous errors aforementioned.
POINT V
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
DISMISSING DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS FOR
FRAUD AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS AND INTERVENING PLAINTIFF UPON THE BASIS THAT "NO PROOF
OF GENERAL DAMAGES OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
WERE SHOWN."

It was prejudicial error for the Court to dismiss appellant's
counterclaims for fraud and the manner in which it was done
seriously weakened appellant's affirmative defenses. The jury
was advised at the outset that appellant was counterclaiming
against both the Bank and the plaintiffs. When the Court
dismissed the counterclaims without explaining to the jury
the reason for the same, it is likely that the jury concluded
that Mr. Hunter did not have valid claims for fraud either by
way of counterclaim or by way of affirmative defense. Further,
the Court merely struck out the word "counterclaim" in some
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instructions, left it in in others, and told the jury that both
counterclaims were dismissed. This must have made the jury
feel that the Court concluded that Mr. Hunter's claims for
fraud were not well founded.
The reason given by the Court for dismissing Mr. Hunter's
counterclaims was that that there was no proof of general or
punitive damages shown. There was certainly evidence of
damage as pointed out in appellant's original brief. To those
statements, the Bank has responded with statements that are
false and not supported anywhere in the record. There is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Hunter ever collected
more than $9,000.00 on the sale of the Universal Rockwell
stock which he transferred, Their brief p. 30. As a matter
of fact, on many of the transactions, Mr. Hunter did not collect, after he thought the stock was worthless, because it would
have been a violation of law to do so. The Bank stated that
Hunter was trying to sell stock in September even though he
knew it was worthless, Their brief p. 7, 30. After he learned
the true condition of Universal Leasing, the only time Mr.
Hunter attempted to sell the stock was when he was approached
by an individual in September of 1970 who said that he represented a group that was interested in purchasing a corporate
shell. He quoted some terms to Hunter. Mr. Hunter advised
him that the stock was worthless and that the corporation
had some serious problems and the individual never contacted
him again. R 485-495, 585.
It is also false to say that he received a computer floor
and air conditioner from Mark Eames in lieu of payment of
$10,000.00. The facts are that Mr. Hunter did get possession
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of said equipment and he had an oral agreement with Mr.
Eames whereby Mr. Eames was to pay $10,000.00 to Mr.
Hunter and give him said equipment for some of Mr. Hunter's
stock in Universal Rockwell. Mr. Eames received the stock
but would not pay the $10,000.00 unless Mr. Hunter signed
leases on the equipment, which he refused to do. Therefore,
that deal fell through and Mr. Hunter retained the equipment,
although he had not yet received title to the same. Subsequently, the title was conveyed to him by Mr. Eames in return
for Mr. Hunter conveying the balance of his shares in Universal Rockwell. At the time, Mr. Eames was attempting to
get all of the shares of Universal Rockwell in order to sell the
same as a corporate shell R 627-630, 580-582, 587.
The statement by the Bank that Mr. Hunter sold the
inventory he received and retained the funds derived therefrom
is absolutely false, Their brief p. 30. So is the statement
that "all Hunter ever paid on the contract was $9,000.00,"
Their brief p. 6. As a matter of fact, the evidence is entirely
to the contrary. Mr. Hunter continually worked with Mr.
Souvall and others to liquidate the collateral that could be sold
and the proceeds from all of these sales went to the Bank.
This amounted to approximately $44,252.69 R 71, 127 lOp
400. One of those payments in the amount of $4,778.00
was made prior to signing the note R 401, 402, Exhibit lOp.
Hunter did not owe $133,500.00 at the time he signed the
note and it was not signed to evidence his indebtedness R 401,
402. It was signed to evidence the fact that he had taken
the stock out of the Bank and his willingness to pay interest
on the SBA loan R 401, 402, 132, 133. The only motivation that Mr. Hunter can determine that the Bank has in
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making such false and misleading statements concerning him
is that they are continuing to attempt to cast him in a bad
light while attempting to vindicate the actions of the plainiffs
and the Bank officers.
Mr. Hunter contends that the 5,188,000 shares of Universal Rockwell stock which he caused to be conveyed back to
the Bank was a fair exchange for the 10,000 shares of Universal Leasing stock which the Bank released to him. The
Bank has responded by saying this is not so since the Universal
Leasing stock was to be free trading while the Universal Rockwell stock which was conveyed back to the Bank was registered
letter stock which could not be freely traded Their brief p 30.
It is appellant's position that it doesn't really make much
difference since the shares of stock he received from the Bank
were worthless and the stock he returned to the Bank was at
least that good.
The bank has continually maintained that Mr. Hunter
received the shares of stock from the Bank by fraud and misrepresentation. This is based upon the allegation that he told
the Bank that he had New York Stock Exchange listed stock
which he would sell and use the proceeds therefrom to pay cash
for the Universal Leasing stock. There is conflicting testimony
in the record on this point. At one point in the testimony of
Mr. Peter Souvall, he said that Mr. Hunter told him, in a
meeting with Donald Bennett and John Langeland also
present, that he had New York listed stock. Later in Pete
Souvall's testimony and in all other testimony about that
meeting, they claimed that Hunter said it was New York stock
R 64, 107, 130, 201, 252, 258. The Bank's statements on
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Page 7 of its brief to the effect that Mr. Hunter admitted that
he had no New York stock or other securities is absolutely
false. Mr. Hunter was asked the question if he had any New
York listed securities and he truthfully answered that he did
not R 499- However, the New York stock which he planned
to liquidate was not referred to as being listed on the New
York Stock Exchange, but rather as being traded in New York.
There is a significant difference between stock listed on the
New York Stock Exchange and shares of stock traded in New
York which are not listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
However, for reasons explained to the Bank, he did not liquidate them at the time R 65, 131. They could hardly have
relied upon his liquidation of this stock at the time they
delivered the Universal Leasing stock to him because he
explained to them that he had not sold it. At any rate, in
Interrogatory No. 9, the jury found that the plaintiffs and the
Bank were not deceived by any such representations.
It is also a fact that prior to the time of the transaction,
Mr. Hunter personally had loans which totaled $25,000.00
with the Bank and was serving as a guarantor for a third party
who had a loan with the Bank R 201, 244. As part of these
transactions, Mr. Hunter had securities pledged with the Bank
and had given them financial information which gave them
actual knowledge of the securities Mr. Hunter owned R 260.
It is also a fact that early in the transaction, the Bank recommended Mr. Hunter to the Souvalls as a man of character and
honor and one who was financially capable of handling the
transaction R 201, 244, 252-257, 259, 710. It is incredible that the Bank can now argue that they were not
aware of Hunter's financial condition and were deceived by
Mr. Hunter's alleged misrepresentation.
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CONCLUSION
Because of the numerous errors set forth herein, defendentappellant is entitled to have this Court reverse the judgment
of the Lower Court and direct entry of judgment for defendantappellant, or in the alternative, remand the case for a new
trial with appropriate instructions.
Respectfully submitted,
STRONG & H A N N I
By
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served two copies of the foregoing
brief on Alvin I. Smith, Esq., Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents, J. C. Penney Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101;
Richard H. Nebeker, Esq., Attorney for Intervening PlaintiffRespondent, 400 Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, this
day of September, 1973.
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